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Is Big Brother Watching You? United States v.
Pineda-Moreno and the Ninth Circuit’s Dismantling
of the Fourth Amendment’s Protections
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Pineda-Moreno,1 the Ninth Circuit was
presented with the question of whether federal agents, without a
warrant, were authorized to “enter the curtilage of [a suspect’s]
home and attach a mobile tracking device to the undercarriage” of
the suspect’s vehicle.2 The court held that, notwithstanding the lack
of a warrant, the agents did not conduct an illegal “search” because
they did not encroach on an area in which the suspect “possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”3 The court arrived at this
conclusion despite the fact that the agents walked up the suspect’s
driveway, stood “a few feet” from his home, and attached a
surveillance device to the underside of his vehicle.4
Over the last thirty years, the Ninth Circuit has effectively
“decimated” the “zone of privacy” that traditionally included the
home, “the home’s curtilage,” and “public” places.5 Consequently,
the Fourth Amendment’s protection “against unreasonable searches
and seizures”6 in the zone of privacy without a warrant is rapidly
crumbling away in the Ninth Circuit.7 In Pineda-Moreno I, the
Ninth Circuit wrongly balanced the competing interests of law
enforcement against Fourth Amendment rights. Rather than
expanding the scope of warrantless searches, the court should have

1. United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 1213.
3. Id. at 1215.
4. Id. at 1213, 1215.
5. United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974) (stating that if a “particular form of surveillance practiced by
the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society”).
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recognized that by ruling in favor of the interests of law
enforcement, it was not only dismantling the Fourth Amendment,
but it was also enabling the creation of a modern-day Oceania8 in the
United States.9
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II describes the facts and
procedural history of Pineda-Moreno I. Next, Part III of this Note
outlines the legal background of the case. Following the legal
background, Part IV sets out the court’s ruling in Pineda-Moreno I.
The ruling is analyzed in Part V, concluding that the Ninth Circuit
made three notable errors in its decision. This Note is then briefly
summarized in Part VI.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2007, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
agent noticed a group of men, including Pineda-Moreno, shopping
in Home Depot’s home and garden section.10 The men were seen
purchasing “large amounts of Vigoro 21-0-0 fertilizer,” which the
agent recognized as a type often used to grow marijuana.11 A month
later, representatives from several stores reported to the DEA that
the men, using cash,12 were purchasing “large quantities of groceries,
irrigation equipment, and deer repellant.”13 After observing that the
men frequently used what turned out to be Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep to
go to and from the stores, the DEA agents tracked the Jeep to a
trailer that Pineda-Moreno was renting.14 Once the DEA located
Pineda-Moreno’s residence, it quickly ramped up its investigation of
him, and, “over a four-month period,” agents “monitored [his] Jeep
using various types of [discrete GPS] mobile tracking devices.”15 The

8. Oceania is the depressed totalitarian society envisioned by George Orwell in his
book 1984.
9. See Pineda II, 617 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The needs of law
enforcement, to which my colleagues seem inclined to refuse nothing, are quickly making
personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here
at last.”).
10. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, CR 07-30036-PA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46844,
at *1 (D. Or. June 16, 2008).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d
1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
14. Id.
15. Id. The devices were “about the size of a bar of soap and had a magnet affixed to its
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agents attached the tracking units to the “underside of PinedaMoreno’s vehicle on seven different occasions.”16 In four instances,
agents installed the devices while the Jeep “was parked on a public
street in front of Pineda-Moreno’s home”; on another occasion, the
Jeep was parked in a “public parking lot”; and, in the remaining two
instances, the vehicle was not only parked in Pineda-Moreno’s
driveway, but it was parked only “a few feet from the side of his
[home].”17 On each occasion, the DEA agents attached the GPS
tracking devices to the Jeep in the early hours of the morning,
between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m.18
Once installed, the tracking units “recorded and logged the
precise movements of the vehicle” and permitted the information to
be accessed remotely, or, in other instances, downloaded once the
device had been removed from the vehicle.19 In September 2007,
after compiling the tracking information for four months, the agents
noticed the Jeep “leaving a suspected marijuana grow site.”20 The
agents followed the Jeep for some time, and eventually pulled it
over.21 Smelling marijuana on one of the passengers in the vehicle,
the agents called in Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents,
who then arrested the three occupants “for violations of immigration
laws.”22 After Pineda-Moreno consented to a search of his trailer and
Jeep, the agents discovered “two large garbage bags full of
marijuana” inside the trailer.23
In November 2007, Pineda-Moreno was indicted by a grand jury
on one count of conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and one count

side, allowing it to be attached to the underside of a car.” Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Using the GPS devices, the DEA discovered that the Jeep “traveled several times
between a remote highway turnout just south of the Oregon-California border,” and to a rural
location in Oregon. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, CR 07-30036-PA, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46844, at *2 (D. Or. June 16, 2008). The vehicle “usually stayed only a few minutes at
either location.” Id. While the agents were unable to discover marijuana grows at the two
locations to which the Jeep regularly traveled, they had discovered a marijuana grow “several
miles from the turnout” two months prior. Id. In addition, an informant had notified the
agents that there remained yet another marijuana grow near the turnout, presumably the one
that Pineda-Moreno and his friends frequented. Id. at *2–3.
20. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1214.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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of manufacturing marijuana.24 At trial, Pineda-Moreno argued that
by installing tracking devices on his vehicle, the DEA agents had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and he “moved to suppress
the evidence obtained from the [devices].”25 The district court
denied his motion, after which Pineda-Moreno “entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress”; a timely appeal followed.26
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The court’s decision in Pineda-Moreno I is the offspring of the
Ninth Circuit’s treatment of Fourth Amendment claims over the last
thirty years. In that time, the Ninth Circuit has consistently
undermined the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.27
While the court’s decisions at first may have seemed innocent and
even agreeable to some, their combination over time has lead to a
decimation of fundamental liberties.28 This section of the Note will
describe five cases that paved the way for the court’s decision in
Pineda-Moreno I.
The Ninth Circuit first chipped away Fourth Amendment rights
in 1982 in United States v. Flores, where it misapplied precedent and
drastically broadened when a “sufficient relationship” existed among
“the crime, the thing to be seized, and the place to be searched.”29
In its ruling, the court upheld the conviction of Flores, who was

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]ourts have gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the point at which it scarcely resembles the robust guarantor of our
constitutional rights we knew when I joined the bench [thirty years ago].”).
28. In Judge Reinhardt’s dissent in Pineda-Moreno II, he lists almost a dozen cases in
which he has dissented against the Ninth Circuit’s continuing obliteration of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. Id. at 1126–27. His list includes, from 1982 to the present: United
States v. Flores, 679 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barona, 56
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995); Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 66 F.3d 217 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc); United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2007); Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc). Id.
29. Flores, 679 F.2d at 175.

212

DO NOT DELETE

209

4/5/2011 8:15 PM

Is Big Brother Watching You?

arrested because of evidence seized “during a search of [his]
apartment for evidence that another convicted felon,” Bontempi, was
committing a crime.30 In sustaining the search warrant, the court
found that because Bontempi had been arrested in Flores’s
apartment before, and since he was pictured in photographs in
Flores’s apartment, a “sufficient relationship” connected “the crime,
the thing to be seized, and the place to be searched.”31 This directly
contradicted the Ninth Circuit’s previous ruling in United States v.
Bailey, where it held that “the fact that an individual has been
arrested at a residence is insufficient to support the issuance of a
warrant to search that residence for items believed to be in the
arrested individual’s possession.”32
Ten years later, in United States v. Kelley, the court held that
without a search warrant, agents could obtain consent to search a
suspect’s private bedroom and closet from a third-party housemate.33
After arresting the suspect, Kelley, and taking him to FBI
headquarters, agents asked his housemate, Bakker, to give her
consent to a search of the house, including Kelley’s private
quarters.34 The court rejected Kelley’s argument that Bakker “lacked
authority to consent to a search of [Kelley’s] bedroom and closet”
and held that Bakker had “joint access and control . . . of the
residence she shared with Kelley,” thereby giving her authority to
consent to the search.35 However, this finding of joint access and
control, which was required by Supreme Court precedent,36 was
30. Id. at 174.
31. Id. at 175–76.
32. Id. at 178 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408,
412 (9th Cir. 1972)). In an effort to assist law enforcement, the Flores court distinguished
Bailey by noting that “whereas the Bailey affidavit contained no additional information linking
the suspect to the residence,” in Flores, the home “contained photographs of Bontempi and
other persons.” Id. at 175–76 (majority opinion). However, Judge Reinhardt noted that the
sentence regarding photographs in the affidavit “is vague and ambiguous at best and can not
[sic] serve to provide the additional facts, required by Bailey, to support a conclusion that
Bontempi was in possession of the apartment.” Id. at 179 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
33. Kelley, 953 F.2d at 566.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563, 566.
36. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (holding that authority to consent
to a search “rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes’” (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7
(1974))); see also Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that “[e]ven
if [the housemate] had express or implied authority to enter appellant’s bedroom for
housekeeping purposes, it would not follow that she could permit a police search of appellant’s
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fiction.37 The extent of Bakker’s access and control over Kelley’s
quarters was to use the telephone kept within; however, even this use
was hypothetical as the two had been housemates “for only three
days prior to her ‘consent,’” the phone was “installed just one day
prior” to the search, and Bakker said that “she merely assumed that
she had permission to enter” the bedroom to use the phone—she
had not used it before, addressed the matter with Kelley, nor even
been in the bedroom.38 Even if Bakker had access to Kelley’s
telephone, this would be insufficient for her to consent to a search of
Kelley’s bedroom and closet.39 This decision was all the more
shocking because until this point, “no reported federal opinion [had]
ever held that third party consent is valid in a situation such as the
one presented here.”40
Then, in United States v. McIver, the Ninth Circuit held that law
enforcement did not need a warrant to install two tracking devices to
the underside of a vehicle because “there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the exterior of a car,” and the vehicle was
“outside the curtilage” of the suspect’s home.41 In McIver, federal
agents used tracking devices to monitor two individuals suspected of
growing marijuana.42 The investigation ultimately resulted in
convictions, which were appealed on the basis that by installing
tracking equipment to their car, the agents violated the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against warrantless searches and seizures.43
The court applied the reasoning of a decision from the Tenth
Circuit, which held that “‘[t]he undercarriage is part of the car’s
exterior, and as such, is not afforded a reasonable expectation of
privacy.’”44 Because the placement of the tracking devices “did not
room, closet, and effects”).
37. See Kelley, 953 F.2d at 568 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 567 n.2.
39. Id. at 568 (“One who has been granted permission to enter a room solely for the
purpose of using the telephone certainly does not have ‘joint access or control for most
purposes’ over that area.”).
40. Id.
41. United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme
Court has held that “only the curtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that
attach to the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). Here, the appellants
conceded that the vehicle in question “was outside the curtilage.” McIver, 186 F.3d at 1126.
42. McIver, 186 F.3d at 1122.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749 (10th Cir.
1993).
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pry into a hidden or enclosed area,” the warrantless invasion of
privacy was upheld.45
Some eight years after McIver, the Ninth Circuit decided United
States v. Black, in which it affirmed a denial to suppress evidence and
upheld a warrantless search of a home on the theory that the search
was a “welfare search” and so was “justified by exigent
circumstances.”46 In Black I, the police received a call from a woman
who claimed that her ex-boyfriend, Black, had beaten her earlier that
morning, that he had a gun, and that she was going to return home
to pick up some belongings but would wait in her car for the police
to arrive.47 After arriving at the scene three minutes later, the police
did not see the car or the woman outside the apartment.48 Seeking
access to the apartment, the police “circled the building to inspect
the backyard area,” where they discovered a man matching Black’s
description.49 After the man identified himself as Black, the police
searched him, and, finding a key, entered and searched his apartment
to see if the woman was there.50 Although the police did not find
anyone inside the apartment, the court upheld the search because it
found that the officers had an “objectively reasonable” basis for their
search, namely, the possibility that the woman was badly injured, or
dead, inside the apartment.51
In United States v. Lemus, the Ninth Circuit held that despite the
lack of a search warrant, officers were authorized to search the area
“‘immediately adjoin[ing] the place of arrest’ . . . without either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion” and to seize “anything in
45. Id.
46. United States v. Black (Black I), 482 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g
denied, United States v. Black (Black II), 482 F.3d 1044, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007).
47. Black I, 482 F.3d at 1039.
48. Id. at 1039, 1040.
49. Id. at 1039.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1040. The majority’s acceptance of the officers’ objectively reasonable belief is
questionable. See id. at 1044 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (stating that the officers did not have “the
kind of ‘specific and articulable facts’ that, when ‘taken together with rational inferences’
would ‘support the warrantless intrusion’” (citation omitted)); Black II, 482 F.3d at 1045
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The panel majority dutifully recites the right standard, but guts it
of all meaning by approving an intrusion into the home that does not remotely satisfy it.”).
Judge Kozinski further pointed out that the majority’s opinion “is entirely backwards,” as it
calls for officers “to err on the . . . side of caution,” like those in Black I, and to enter homes to
search for possible victims, as opposed to “erring on the side of caution,” and obtaining search
warrants to enter homes. Black II, 482 F.3d at 1046 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Black
I, 482 F.3d at 1040).
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plain view that they discovered” during their search.52 In Lemus I,
officers arrested a suspect “before he could fully enter the doorway”
to his apartment. They then searched the suspect’s living room,
bedroom, and bathroom to prevent a possible ambush, and after
noticing “something sticking out” from underneath a couch
cushion, lifted the cushion to find a pistol.53 The court’s decision is
surprising. Police were allowed access to someone’s home, “[t]he
place where warrantless searches are deemed ‘presumptively
unreasonable,’” with no support at all save for mere “curiosity.”54
This decision destroyed “[w]hatever may have been left of the
Fourth Amendment after” the court’s decision in Black.55 While it
may seem that the Ninth Circuit could not possibly gut the Fourth
Amendment any more after the holding described above, its latest
decision in Pineda-Moreno I found a way to do just that.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
On appeal, Pineda-Moreno argued that the DEA agents violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by (1) “invad[ing] an area in which he
possesse[d] a reasonable expectation of privacy,”56 (2) “attaching
mobile tracking devices to his Jeep while it was parked on a street in
front of his home and in a public parking lot,”57 and (3)
“monitor[ing] the location of his Jeep” using devices “not generally
used by the public.”58 Each of these arguments will be analyzed
below.

52. United States v. Lemus (Lemus I), 582 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)), reh’g denied, United States v. Lemus (Lemus II)
596 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 2010). Tellingly, the court declared that “[e]ven assuming that there
were no articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent police officer to believe
that Lemus’s apartment harbored an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene,
we nevertheless affirm the district court’s denial of the suppression motion.” Id. at 959–60.
53. Lemus I, 582 F.3d at 960.
54. Lemus II, 596 F.3d at 513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
55. Id. (“The evisceration of this crucial constitutional protector of the sanctity and
privacy of what Americans consider their castles is pretty much complete. Welcome to the fish
bowl.”).
56. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d
1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 1215.
58. Id. at 1216.
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A. Agents Intruded upon Pineda-Moreno’s Curtilage

Pineda-Moreno’s first argument is that federal agents violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by “entering his driveway” in the early
morning hours, crossing into his curtilage, and attaching “tracking
devices to the underside of his Jeep.”59 Citing United States v.
McIver,60 the court rejected his argument and held that while the
agents conceded that the “Jeep was parked within the curtilage of his
home . . . it was parked in his driveway, which ‘is only a semi-private
area.’”61 To properly “establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in
[his] driveway,” the court held that he had to show that he used
“special features” such as “enclosures, barriers, [or] lack of visibility
from the street” to exclude others from his driveway.62 Because no
“special features” protected Pineda-Moreno’s driveway, he could not
“claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, regardless of whether
a portion of it was located within the curtilage of his home.”63 The
court also rejected the argument that Pineda-Moreno “possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy” in his driveway during the early
morning hours by holding that “the time of day is immaterial” in
such an analysis.64 Finally, the court held that Pineda-Moreno had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the underside of his car because
its undercarriage is “part of its exterior.”65
B. Agents Attached Tracking Units While Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep was
Parked in Public Places
Pineda-Moreno next argued that by “attaching mobile tracking
devices to his Jeep while it was parked on a street in front of his
59. Id. at 1214.
60. 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). See text at supra note 41 for a summary of the
court’s decision.
61. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215 (first alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975)).
62. Id. (first alteration in original).
63. Id. The court substantiated its holding by reasoning that there were “no features to
prevent someone standing in the street from seeing the entire driveway,” and further, “[i]f a
neighborhood child had walked up Pineda-Moreno’s driveway and crawled under his Jeep to
retrieve a lost ball or runaway cat, Pineda-Moreno would have no grounds to complain,” as his
“driveway had no gate,” and no “‘No Trespassing’ signs.” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing McIver, 186 F.3d at 1127 (holding that “the undercarriage is part of the
car’s exterior, and as such, is not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy” (quotations
omitted))).
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home and in a public parking lot,” agents violated his Fourth
66
Amendment rights. The court rejected this argument as well, again
citing McIver where the court held that officers did not “invade an
area in which a suspect possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy
when they attach[ed] a mobile tracking device to a car parked in his
driveway but outside the curtilage of his home.”67 Noting that
Pineda-Moreno conceded that McIver “foreclosed” his argument,
the court held that “Pineda-Moreno [could] assert no reasonable
expectation of privacy” to a public area, including a public street or
parking lot.68
C. Agents Monitored Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep Using Spy Equipment
Finally, Pineda-Moreno argued that the DEA agents violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by “monitor[ing] the location of his
Jeep” using devices “not generally used by the public.”69 PinedaMoreno pointed to Kyllo v. United States, where the Supreme Court
held that the use of “sense-enhancing technology” to obtain “‘any
information . . . that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology in question is
not in general public use.’”70 Applying this language, PinedaMoreno argued that agents “conduct a ‘search’ whenever they use
sense-enhancing technology not available to the general public to
obtain information.”71 The court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the sense-enhancing technology used in Kyllo was “a substitute
for a search unequivocally within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”72 Instead, the court ruled that this issue was
controlled by United States v. Knotts73: because officers do not
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing McIver, 186 F.3d at 1126).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1216.
70. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”); see also United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (“But Kyllo
does not help our defendant, because his case unlike Kyllo is not one in which technology
provides a substitute for a form of search unequivocally governed by the Fourth Amendment.
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conduct a search by following a car on public roads, the agents “did
not conduct an impermissible search of Pineda-Moreno’s car by
monitoring its location with mobile tracking devices.”74
V. ANALYSIS
In deciding Pineda-Moreno I, the Ninth Circuit made three
errors: (1) it wrongly concluded that DEA agents did not conduct an
unreasonable search when they monitored the location of PinedaMoreno’s car over a period of four months; (2) it incorrectly held
that Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to
his driveway; and (3) it wrongly relied on United States v. Knotts in
reaching its conclusion. These three arguments are set out below.
A. Federal Agents Conducted an Unreasonable Search
The Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that DEA agents did not
conduct an unreasonable search of Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep despite the
fact that they continuously and “repeatedly monitored” its
movements over a period of four months.75 In determining whether
GPS surveillance constitutes a “search,” courts apply the Katz test in
which a court determines (1) whether an individual has exhibited a
“subjective expectation of privacy,” and (2) whether that expectation
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively]
‘reasonable.’”76 In balancing the two prongs, “the Court has chosen
to weigh far more heavily” the second prong.77
1. Pineda-Moreno had a subjective expectation of privacy
A person demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy when
he or she “seeks to preserve [something] as private.”78 This privacy

The substitute here is for an activity, namely following a car on a public street, that is
unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the amendment.”).
74. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1217.
75. Id. at 1213.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 429 (2007) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
525 n.7 (1984) (“The Court has always emphasized the second of these two requirements.”)).
78. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 209, 211
(1986), the court reasoned that because the defendant had installed two fences, one six feet
tall, the other ten feet tall, around the perimeter of his property, he showed a “subjective intent
and desire to maintain privacy.” However, since he did not shield his land from aerial views,
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extends even to objects that otherwise would have been accessible to
the public.79 Here, the court concluded that because agents merely
obtained “a log of the locations where Pineda-Moreno’s car
traveled,” no privacy interest was invaded.80 Sadly, the court failed to
consider the totality of the agents’ intrusion into Pineda-Moreno’s
privacy. The agents continuously monitored and recorded his
vehicle’s every movement over a period of four months.81 Unlike a
person’s “movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s
movements over the course of [four months] is not actually exposed
to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those
movements is effectively nil.”82 Moreover, despite the exposure of
“each individual movement,” the “whole reveals more—sometimes a
great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”83 Furthermore,
rather than completely dismissing the fact that Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep
was parked on his driveway, only “a few feet” from his home, the
panel should have afforded his privacy a heightened degree of
protection since it was parked within his home’s curtilage.84 By
failing to recognize the totality of the agents’ privacy invasion, the
court erred in concluding that the agents “conducted no search.”85
2. Pineda-Moreno’s expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable
In determining whether society is prepared to accept a person’s
privacy expectation as objectively reasonable, the second prong of
Katz, courts look to the degree of the government’s intrusion into a
person’s privacy.86 If the government’s actions are such that they
the government was free to inspect his backyard from the air. Id.
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
80. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1216–17.
81. Id. at 1213.
82. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
police’s continuous use of a GPS tracking device for one month “was a search because it
defeated [the defendant’s] reasonable expectation of privacy”).
83. Id. Moreover, “[we] largely expect the freedom to move about in relative anonymity
without the government keeping an individualized, turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and
goings.” Hutchins, supra note 78, at 455.
84. See Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1213, 1215; see also infra Part V.B.
85. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215.
86. Hutchins, supra note 77, at 430 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
122–23 (1984)). Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding a high
degree of government intrusion, and holding that because the government “listen[ed] to and
record[ed] the petitioner’s words,” it “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using [a] telephone booth,” and thus, it violated the Fourth Amendment), with Smith v.
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“would have been objectionable to the framers,”87 or, if they violate
88
“understandings that are recognized or permitted by society,” then
the privacy expectation is considered objectively reasonable. Here,
the court should have found that the government used an
“extrasensory surveillance aid” as opposed to a “sense-augmenting”
89
device to monitor Pineda-Moreno. This extrasensory surveillance
aid enabled the government to gather a large quantity of data
regarding Pineda-Moreno’s movements, and by doing so, the court
should have found a high degree of government intrusion into
Pineda-Moreno’s privacy. Furthermore, the government’s intrusion
was such that the Framers would have surely objected to the
90
warrantless invasion of privacy.
The high degree of intrusion into Pineda-Moreno’s privacy is
evidenced by comparing the tracking devices from Pineda-Moreno I
91
to the tracking device at issue in United States v. Knotts. In Knotts,
the Supreme Court held that a beeper unit, which emitted a periodic
electronic beep tone and which enabled officers to follow a suspect’s
vehicle, was a sense-augmenting device and did not invade a
92
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Unlike the beeper, the
surveillance unit in Pineda-Moreno I was a GPS-enabled tracking
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding a low degree of government intrusion because
the surveillance device used by authorities, a pen register, had only “limited capabilities”).
87. Hutchins, supra note 77, at 430 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152–53
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
88. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Jacobsen,
466 U.S. at 123 n.22) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See Hutchins, supra note 77, at 432–38 (explaining the difference between
“extrasensory surveillance,” or a device that “reveals information otherwise indiscernible to the
unaided human senses,” and “sense-augmenting surveillance,” which refers to a device that
“reveals information that could theoretically be attained through one of the five human
senses”).
90. The Fourth Amendment
was the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without
warrants . . . . Because the experience of the framers of the Bill of Rights was so
vivid, they assumed that [their experiences] would be carried down the stream of
history and that their words would receive the significance of the experience to
which they were addressed . . . . When the Fourth Amendment outlawed
“unreasonable searches” and then went on to define the very restricted authority
that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant
authorizes it.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
91. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
92. Id.
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device, which allowed federal agents to remotely monitor every
single movement Pineda-Moreno made from June to September
93
2007. To have accomplished the same feat with beeper units would
have required multiple vehicles and dozens of agents working around
the clock, seven days a week. The sophistication and capability of the
devices in Pineda-Moreno I had such a degree of “technological
94
enhancement of ordinary perception” that it turned the remote
monitoring into a Fourth Amendment search.
Even if the surveillance were “sense-augmenting,” and thus not
deserving of a heightened degree of protection, because of the
undoubtedly large quantity of data collected by the agents, the
95
persistent surveillance of Pineda-Moreno constituted a search. This
96
“quantity analysis,” acknowledged by the Court in Dow Chemical
97
Co. v. United States, aggregates the data logged by law
enforcement. It has Fourth Amendment implications because of “the
98
quantity of information revealed,” and not because of the
99
information’s quality. Pineda-Moreno may have understood that
portions of his travels would be observed by others, but it is most
unlikely that he “contemplate[d] a comprehensive mapping of [his]
whereabouts over a span of [four months], including the location of
100
each stop and the duration of every trip segment.” Because of the
invasive nature of the extrasensory tracking device used by the DEA,
and the large amount of personal data collected, the Ninth Circuit
should have found that agents conducted an unreasonable search,
and therefore, should have had a warrant to track Pineda-Moreno’s
Jeep.

93. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
94. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
95. See Hutchins, supra note 77, at 456. Professor Hutchins further stated that “the
appropriate constitutional treatment of GPS-enhanced surveillance is not tied up in Knotts
because, as a factual matter, beeper and GPS technology are fundamentally different in terms
of the quantity of information revealed by the science.” Id. at 457.
96. Id. at 453.
97. 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (holding that federal agents’ aerial photography of an
industrial plant was not a search (1) because it was a mere enhancement of human vision, and
(2) because the quantity of information discovered was minimal).
98. Hutchins, supra note 77, at 457.
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id. at 453.

222

DO NOT DELETE

209

4/5/2011 8:15 PM

Is Big Brother Watching You?

B. Agents Intruded upon Pineda-Moreno’s Curtilage Without a
Warrant
The Ninth Circuit also incorrectly held that Pineda-Moreno had
no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his driveway. The majority
itself acknowledged “that Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep was parked within
the curtilage of his home when the agents attached the tracking
101
device.” However, the court then reasoned that even if the car
were “parked within the curtilage of the home,” because “it was
102
parked in [the] driveway [it was] only a semiprivate area.” By
focusing its analysis on whether the driveway was open to the public,
the court failed to consider the controlling issue—the fact that
federal agents had intruded upon the curtilage of the home.
“Curtilage” is defined as “[t]he land or yard adjoining a house,”
or, for purposes of “the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage is an area
103
usu[ally] protected from warrantless searches.” Indeed, “it has
come to mean those portions of a homeowner’s property so closely
associated with the home as to be considered part of it,” and “once
it is determined that something is part of the curtilage, it’s entitled
to precisely the same Fourth Amendment protections as the home
104
itself.”
Thus, regardless of whether a driveway is only
“semiprivate,” as both the government and the court conceded, the
Jeep was parked within an area that should have been entitled to the
same degree of Fourth Amendment protection as Pineda-Moreno’s
home, and therefore, the agents should have been required to have a
warrant to attach the tracking device.
Even if the Jeep were not parked within the home’s curtilage, the
majority’s reliance on the driveway being open to the public is also
flawed. The court would require persons to support an expectation
of privacy in their driveway by constructing “special features,” such
105
as “enclosures, barriers, [or] lack of visibility from the street”;
otherwise, like a “neighborhood child” retrieving a ball from
beneath a car, federal agents can similarly “crawl under [one’s]

101. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010).
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
104. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (“[O]nly the curtilage . . . warrants
the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home.”)).
105. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215.
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car . . . and tinker with [its] undercarriage.” The court’s rule allows
only those willing to spend money to adequately protect their
property by implementing “special features”: installing video
cameras, motion sensors, and electronic gates; constructing security
booths and towering fences; and hiring security guards and
107
canines. Unfortunately, for most “of the 60 million people living
in the Ninth Circuit,” their privacy will be “materially diminished”
108
by the court’s decision.
C. The Court Wrongly Relied on Knotts
The Ninth Circuit wrongly applied language from United States
109
v. Knotts in reaching its conclusion in Pineda-Moreno I. Because
the DEA agents obtained information that they “could have
110
obtained by following the car” (albeit everywhere he went, 24hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week, for four months), the court applied
Knotts, and held that “‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
111
movements from one place to another.’” However, the panel
112
erroneously applied Knotts to the set of facts in Pineda-Moreno I.
In fact, the Supreme Court “explicitly distinguished between the
limited information discovered by use of the beeper—movements
during a discrete journey—and more comprehensive or sustained
113
monitoring of the sort at issue” in Pineda-Moreno I. Further, the
Knotts court reserved for a later date the specific question of

106. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“To say that the
police may do on your property what urchins might do spells the end of Fourth Amendment
protections for most people’s curtilage.”).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
110. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
111. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82).
112. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat the
Supreme Court actually held in Knotts, . . . is that you have no expectation of privacy as against
police who are conducting visual surveillance, albeit ‘augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancements as science and technology afford[s]
them.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282)).
113. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Knotts held only
that ‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,’ not that such a person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end, as the
Government would have it.” (citations omitted) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)).
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“whether a warrant would be required in a case involving ‘twenty114
four hour surveillance’” and stated that “‘if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
115
may be applicable.’” Accordingly, there is a definite distinction
between using a beeper, a sensory-enhancing device to facilitate
visual tracking, and using a GPS-enabled tracking device to conduct
116
constant surveillance of a vehicle for four months. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit erred by improperly applying the ruling of Knotts to
the very different set of facts of Pineda-Moreno I.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pineda-Moreno I continues the
circuit’s decimation of the Fourth Amendment. It is frightening that
the court continues to disregard the Fourth Amendment’s
117
protections for “one-fifth of the country’s population,” especially
considering the many errors in the majority’s analysis. Rather than
continuing to bow to the interests of law enforcement, the court
must soon realize that “[t]he Fourth Amendment demands that we
temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern for the
118
impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use.” The
court assures the reader that “[s]hould [the] government someday
decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a
119
search.” However, the court continues to create a dangerous
collection of precedents, and its decisions, in the aggregate, may very
120
well be “dire and irreversible,” and they certainly bring cautioning
words from 1984 to mind:
114. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84).
115. Id.
116. “The technological precursor to GPS, the beeper, is a battery-operated device that
emits a weak radio signal that [must] be followed using a receiver. Beepers do not provide
pinpointed targeting of suspects and do not permit the remote tracking of targets [unlike a
GPS-enabled device].” Hutchins, supra note 76, at 411 n.8.
117. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
118. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original)
(internal quotations marks omitted).
120. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759) (“They that can give up essential
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There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. . . . It was even conceivable that
they watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live,
from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every
sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every
movement scrutinized.121

If the Ninth Circuit does not change its approach to Fourth
Amendment claims and begin restoring the Amendment’s
protections, one day soon, those living in the Ninth Circuit may
122
“wake up and find [they’re] living in Oceania.”
Phillip R. Sumpter

liberty to obtain a little safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”); THOMAS JEFFERSON,
NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 121 (William Peden ed., 1955) (“[T]he time to guard
against corruption and tyranny is before they shall have gotten hold of us. It is better to keep
the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have
entered.”).
121. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 3 (Signet Classic 1961) (1949).
122. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
 J.D. Candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I would like to thank my wife, Robin, for all her love and support—both on this
Note and throughout law school.

226

